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HOMELESSNESS, CRIMINAL
RESPONSIBILITY, AND THE
PATHOLOGIES OF POLICY:
TRIANGULATING ON A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOUSING
R. GEORGE WRIGHT†
INTRODUCTION
The importance of a roof over one’s head seems clear to most
of us. But private charity, the insurance markets, and the
regulatory state offer no guarantees that this most elemental
need will be even minimally met. This Article focuses on the
continuing denial of any federal constitutional right to even
minimal housing,1 despite the sense that basic values such as
meaningful liberty, equality, community, fundamental human
flourishing, and basic capacity development seem to suggest a
right.2
Given that arguments for a constitutional right to even
minimal3 housing from these clearly basic values alone have by
themselves not yet moved the needle, this Article takes a
different approach. The focus herein supplements the basic
values arguments with other important considerations that
triangulate, or converge, on a federal constitutional right to
housing.
These considerations, in their joint convergence,
collectively exert additional moral and intellectual pressure in
favor of recognizing the constitutional right in question.

†
Lawrence A. Jegen Professor of Law, Indiana University Robert H. McKinney
School of Law. The author's thanks are hereby gratefully extended to Kylee Tomblin.
1
See, for a cursory treatment at the federal constitution level, Lindsey v.
Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
2
See infra Part I.
3
In large measure, this Article leaves open the precise contours and limits of a
constitutional right to housing as best resolved through discussion, experience,
experiment, and revision, partly at the stage of implementation. For some guidance
in this respect, though, see infra notes 179–183 and accompanying text.
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In particular, the case law addressing homelessness, and
homelessness-related conditions and activities, as criminal
offenses avoids considering any possible constitutional right to
housing.
Imposing criminal responsibility implies, without
discussion, the absence of any relevant constitutional right to
engage in the homelessness-related conduct in question. But
criminalization of homelessness-related conditions and activities
turns out to be, as argued below, hopelessly burdened with
unresolvable basic theoretical problems.4 These basic problems
are inherent not only in homelessness-specific contexts,5 but less
dramatically and less conspicuously in other contexts as well.6
Recognizing a constitutional right to housing would allow the
courts and society to bypass these unresolvable basic problems of
purported individual criminal responsibility in the context of
homelessness-related crimes.
The converging pressures for recognizing at least some
minimal constitutional right to housing build further when we
then go on, separately, to consider how the officially adopted
policies of governments, at all levels, and across a wide range of
contexts, have causally contributed in important ways to the
incidence and pathologies of homelessness.7 Governments cannot
at this point legitimately seek to stand apart from the problems
of homelessness and then independently assess, with utter
detachment, the gravity of such problems as though
homelessness-related problems were entirely natural or privately
generated phenomena. Governments at all levels are already
actively involved in various ways in causing and in at least
minimally addressing, however ineffectively, the problems of
homelessness.8 A range of government policies at all levels
contributes to the most basic harms of homelessness. However
radical someone might think a federal constitutional right to
housing is, recognizing such a right would amount to a corrective
of causally relevant current government policies, rather than an
initial, perhaps gratuitous, entry by government into new
territory.9

4
5
6
7
8
9

See infra Part I.
See infra notes 27–88 and accompanying text.
See infra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
See infra Part II.
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When we then finally return to and briefly further consider
the classic values case for a constitutional right to housing—as a
third, triangulating, converging source of moral and intellectual
pressure and motivation10—the case for recognizing a federal
constitutional right to at least minimal housing becomes far more
difficult to dismiss.
I. IS THERE A JUSTIFIED AND WORKABLE DISTINCTION
BETWEEN PERSONALLY CULPABLE AND NONCULPABLE
HOMELESSNESS?
A number of the leading homelessness cases take a stand on
questions of criminal responsibility for homelessness-related
offenses. In the end, though, the cases do not adopt or imply any
coherent approach to the inescapable questions of responsibility
that are at issue.11 An approach, such as that herein, that can
legitimately bypass these perennially unresolved issues of
responsibility is thus attractive.
The starting point for judicial discussions of this sort,
including in particular the possible applicability of cruel and
unusual punishment doctrine, is the classic narcotic addiction
case of Robinson v. California.12 Robinson itself did not involve
homelessness, but rather the presumed status of being addicted,
whatever the lines of causality, to narcotics.13 The offense in
10
See infra Part III. Of special interest is that the case for a constitutional right
to housing, at the level of basic values, need not itself converge on any single
substantive value or set of values. A constitutional right to housing can be defended
on either overlapping, cumulating, or some distinct ground. See Cass R. Sunstein,
Incompletely Theorized Agreements, 108 HARV. L. REV. 1733, 1734 (1995); see also
John Rawls, The Idea of an Overlapping Consensus, 7 OX. J. LEGAL STUD. 1, 4, 9,
24–25 (1987).
11
Among the leading and most suggestive cases, chronologically, are Robinson
v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); Powell v. Texas, 392 U.S. 514, 536–37 (1968);
Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1583 (S.D. Fla. 1992); Tobe v. City of
Santa Ana, 9 Cal. 4th 1069, 1109, 892 P.2d 1145, 1169, 40 Cal. Rptr. 2d 402, 426
(1995); Johnson v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1138 (9th Cir. 2006), vacated
as moot following settlement, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007); Lehr v. City of
Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218, 1234 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Allen v. City of
Sacramento, 234 Cal. App. 4th 41, 69, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 678 (2015); People v.
Diaz, 24 Cal. App. 5th Supp. 1, 8, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 427, 432 (2018); Manning v.
Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139, 153 (4th Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded en banc, 930 F.3d
264 (4th Cir. 2019); Martin v. City of Boise, 902 F.3d 1031, 1049 (9th Cir. 2018),
opinion amended and superseded on denial of reh’g, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019);
O’Callaghan v. City of Portland, 736 Fed. Appx. 704, 705–06 (9th Cir. 2018); and
First Lutheran Church v. City of St. Paul, 2018 WL 3762560, at *8 (D. Minn. 2018).
12
See Robinson, 370 U.S. at 664.
13
See id. at 665.
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question did not require a showing of either possession or use of
any narcotic while within the State of California.14 The Court
thus sought to distinguish between criminalizing what it referred
to as a “status”—in particular, the status of being an addict—and
criminalizing some behavior or conduct, even of a passive or
negative sort.15
There, the presumed status of drug addiction was conceived
of as an illness,16 and thus analogous to having a common cold.17
As any criminal punishment for merely having a cold would
presumably constitute cruel and unusual punishment,18 so any
punishment for the mere status or condition of being addicted to
a narcotic would similarly violate the Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause.19 The cruelty and unusualness of the
punishment in such cases derives not from the length or severity
of the criminal punishment, but from the inappropriateness of
any punishment in such a case at all.20
The United States Supreme Court returned to these themes
in their divided opinions in the public drunkenness and
alcoholism case of Powell v. Texas.21 In Powell, the four Justice
plurality rejected the defendant’s Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause challenge and distinguished the prior
holding in Robinson.22 Crucially, California had attempted to
criminally punish a mere status, that of being addicted, in
Robinson.23 But Texas, in the later Powell case, had criminalized
not the presumed status or condition of being an alcoholic,24 but
the public behavior or conduct of appearing drunk in public on a
particular occasion.25
The plurality in Powell thus again sought to rely on a
distinction between a mere status or condition on the one hand,
and conduct or behavior on the other.26 The Powell plurality
14

See id. at 665–66.
See id. at 665–68.
16
See id. at 667.
17
See id.
18
See id.
19
See id.
20
See id.
21
See generally 392 U.S. 514 (1968) (plurality opinion).
22
See id. at 532–33.
23
See id. at 532.
24
See id.
25
See id.
26
See id. at 533; see also Lehr v. City of Sacramento, 624 F. Supp. 2d 1218,
1228–29 (E.D. Cal. 2009); Tobe v. City of Santa Ana, 9 Cal. 4th 1069, 1105, 892 P.2d
15
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interprets Robinson to rest upon this purported distinction,
rather than on a distinction between voluntary acts27 and
involuntary conduct,28 or conduct that occurs under some
relevant sort of compulsion.29 Importantly, the plurality in
Powell argues for the difficulty of limiting, in any principled and
attractive way, the exclusion from punishment of “involuntary”
or somehow “compelled” conduct.30 In particular, the plurality
argues that
[i]f Leroy Powell cannot be convicted of public intoxication, it is
difficult to see how a State can convict an individual for murder,
if that individual, while exhibiting normal behavior in all other
respects, suffers from a “compulsion” to kill, which is an
“exceedingly
strong
influence,”
but
“not
completely
overpowering.”31

The plurality in Powell was thus concerned that attempts to
restrict familiar understandings of personal32 or moral33
accountability34 could themselves be limited only on an arbitrary
and unprincipled basis.35
As it turned out, however, Justice White’s opinion concurring
in the Powell result36 might for some purposes be treated as the
technical holding in Powell.37 Justice White appears to question
the plurality’s use of both the supposed status versus conduct

1145, 1166 (1995); Allen v. City of Sacramento, 183 Cal. Rptr. 3d 654, 669–70 (2015)
(“What constitutes ‘might elude perfect definition,’ but factors such as the
involuntary acquisition of the characteristic . . . and the degree to which a person
has control over that characteristic” are to be included). The obvious problem here is
that this account relies, without clarification, on the ideas of voluntariness and
involuntariness, and on the equally underdeveloped idea of “control” and degrees
thereof. See Ashbaucher v. City of Arcata, 2010 WL 11211481, at *9, *10 (N.D. Cal.
Aug. 19, 2010).
27
See Powell, 392 U.S. at 533.
28
See id.
29
See id.
30
See id. at 534.
31
Id.
32
See id. at 535.
33
See id. at 535–36.
34
See id.
35
See id. at 534–35.
36
See id. at 548 (White, J., concurring).
37
See generally Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188 (1977) (seeking to
establish the Court’s judicial holding in the absence of any single majority rationale).
But see Gibson v. Am. Cyanamid Co., 760 F.3d 600, 619–21 (7th Cir. 2014)
(discussing the logical limitations of the Marks rule).
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distinction and its understanding of the voluntariness versus
involuntariness distinction.38 Justice White argues at the level of
principle that
[i]f it cannot be a crime to have an irresistible compulsion to
use39 narcotics, . . . I do not see how it can constitutionally be a
crime to yield to such a compulsion. Punishing an addict for
using drugs convicts for addiction40 under a different name.
Distinguishing between the two crimes is like forbidding
criminal conviction for being sick with flu41 or epilepsy but
permitting punishment for running a fever or having a
convulsion.42

Set aside, for the moment, all complications associated with
possible voluntariness, negligence or recklessness, assumption of
the risk, responsibility, or the inevitability or blamelessness of
some instances of either addiction or the flu, or the severity of flu
symptoms.43
Justice White, however, nonetheless voted to uphold Powell’s
conviction, on the theory that the conviction was not for
alcoholism or drinking chronically, or for being drunk, but for
appearing in a public place while drunk.44 The compulsion to
drink or to drink to excess was not shown, in this case, to
encompass any necessity to appear thus in any public place, as
distinct from, say, a private home.45 Justice White was of the
view that “common sense and . . . common knowledge”46 suggest
that a chronic alcoholic need not appear in public while
intoxicated.47

38

See Powell, 392 U.S. at 549–50 (White, J., concurring).
Justice White at this point cites Robinson not for a status versus conduct
distinction, but for the non-criminalizability of the presumably compelled use of the
addictive drug. See id. at 548 (White, J., concurring).
40
Addiction is classified by Robinson as a status, but on Justice White’s view,
not meaningfully distinguishable, as to culpability or responsibility, from the closely
associated somehow compelled conduct.
41
It would seem that in some cases, catching or having the flu, and displaying
flu symptoms of whatever severity, could reflect the sufferer’s earlier choices or
conduct. See, e.g., Flu (Influenza), VACCINES (January 2018), https://www.vaccines.
gov/diseases/flu; Flu Treatment with Antiviral Drugs, WEBMD, https://www.webmd.
com/cold-and-flu/flu-medications#1 (last visited Aug. 17, 2019,). See generally infra
note 154 and accompanying text.
42
Powell, 392 U.S. at 548 (White, J., concurring) (internal citations omitted).
43
For a start on such matters, consider the sources cited supra note 41.
44
See Powell, 392 U.S. at 549 (White, J., concurring).
45
See id.
46
Id. at 549.
47
See id. at 549–50.
39

2019]

HOMELESSNESS, CRIMINALITY, AND POLICY

433

The four Justice dissenting opinion in Powell48 then
formulated the key issue as one of the scope of the relevant
compulsion or disease,49 with status or condition encompassing
not just compelled intoxication but also including appearing in
public while thus intoxicated.50 In the language of the Powell
dissenting opinion, the question was
whether a criminal penalty may be imposed upon a person
suffering the disease of “chronic alcoholism” for a condition—
being in a state of intoxication in public—which is a
characteristic part51 of the pattern of his disease and . . . not the
consequence of appellant’s volition but of “a compulsion
symptomatic52 of the disease of chronic alcoholism.”53

Justice Fortas concluded that despite the differences between the
statutes in Robinson and Powell, the basic logic of Robinson
controlled the result in Powell.54 While the statute in Powell
required more than a showing of chronic alcoholism or
uncontrollable drinking,55 “in both cases the particular defendant
was accused of being in a condition which he had no capacity to
change or avoid.”56 The condition in Powell’s case included the
realistic inability to avoid being intoxicated in some public place
at some time.57
Ultimately, the principle adopted by Justice Fortas’s
dissenting opinion is that punishment is inappropriate “if the
condition essential to constitute the defined crime is part of the

48
See id. at 554 (Fortas J., dissenting). Justice Fortas was joined by Justices
Douglas, Brennan, and Stewart.
49
See id. at 558.
50
See id.
51
The idea of a “characteristic” part as used here presumably refers not merely
to what typically occurs, but to what must occur in conjunction with the disease
itself with some sufficient compulsion or inescapability.
52
As with the reference to that which is “characteristic” of the disease, see
Powell, 392 U.S. at 558 (Fortas, J., dissenting), so the reference to a symptom of the
disease presumably incorporates some sufficient degree of necessity or compulsion.
53
See id.
54
See id. at 567–68.
55
See id. at 567.
56
Id. at 568.
57
See id.

434

ST. JOHN’S LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 93:427

pattern of [the] disease and is occasioned by a compulsion
symptomatic of the disease.”58 This principle is, interestingly,
claimed to be “narrow in scope and applicability.”59
The Powell dissent’s formulation, however, raises more
questions than it answers. Most importantly, the narrowness or
breadth of the principle cannot forever be entirely a matter of
Justice Fortas’s own expectations. The logic of a declared
principle may have a life of its own. In particular, the principle
may, by its own logic, break through whatever narrow
constraints its adopters had in mind.
One crucial and obvious possibility, as noted below,60 is that
the principles endorsed by both the four Justice dissent and by
Justice White in the Powell case may not be logically confinable
to narcotic addiction, to chronic alcoholism, to any set of
recognized diseases, or even to disease in general, whether the
condition in question arises through conduct or not. Neither the
presence of a medical disease, nor of diseases in general, may be
particularly relevant to questions of moral or legal responsibility.
As well, the attempt, running throughout both Robinson and
Powell, to distinguish between statuses on the one hand and
conduct on the other may well be doomed to failure. At the very
least, the status versus conduct distinction may tell us very
little about persuasively distinguishing responsible criminal
defendants from those who cannot properly be held responsible.
Even setting aside the typical defenses and excusing
conditions, a defendant’s conduct may, on one theory or another,
be compelled,61 or may result from a sort of “compulsion,”62
beyond the defendant’s “capacity to change or avoid,”63 entirely
apart from any recognized disease or special condition.
Responsibility may also be inappropriate even in the absence of
any form of compulsion if the status or conduct at issue reflects
not choice but mere random processes.64
58
Id. at 569. Thus, both the relevant disease and the ensuing criminalized
conduct might both be compelled, with the latter perhaps compelled by the former,
or by other causes.
59
Id.
60
See infra notes 90–101 and accompanying text.
61
See supra text accompanying notes 42, 47.
62
See supra text accompanying notes 42, 47.
63
See supra text accompanying note 45.
64
See infra notes 90–99 and accompanying text, as well as the convenient
collection of brief references to the implications of merely random processes in The
Standard Argument Against Free Will, THE INFO. PHILOSOPHER (last visited Aug. 7,
2019), www.informationphilosopher.com/freedom/standard_argument.html.
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Ultimately, focusing on supposedly distinctive statuses or
conditions and related conduct, even with the familiar sorts of
legal defenses and excuses, may turn out to be logically
underinclusive in mapping the absence of criminal responsibility.
Disease, addiction, or homelessness may in the end merely point
the way to a much narrower scope for any genuine
criminal responsibility. Thus, persuasively imputing criminal
responsibility to persons in homelessness-related contexts and
beyond may be surprisingly difficult.
This possibility is highlighted by reflecting broadly on the
cases addressing65 whether a conviction for homelessness-related
offenses might violate the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause.66 Among the most recent and illuminating cases is the
Ninth Circuit’s opinion in Martin v. City of Boise.67
Martin holds specifically that “the Eighth Amendment
prohibits the imposition of criminal penalties for sitting,
sleeping, or lying outside on public property for homeless
individuals who cannot obtain shelter.”68 The theory there is
that no criminal punishment is defensible and appropriate for
sitting, sleeping, or lying, whether thought of as statuses or as
conduct,69 insofar as such statuses or conduct are realistically
unavoidable, as the “universal and unavoidable consequences of
being human.”70 As being homeless in public places cannot itself

65
Eighth Amendment issues would not be reached in the absence of a plaintiff’s
standing, as when a court deems that no relevant punishment has been threatened
or applied. See, e.g., Johnson v. City of Dallas, 61 F.3d 443, 445 (5th Cir. 1995).
66
Strictly, typical criminal homelessness cases involving state or municipal law
consider the Eighth Amendment prohibition against cruel and unusual punishment
as the Eighth Amendment is made binding on the states through its incorporation
into the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause, which itself binds states and
cities therein. See, e.g., Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 296 (1991); Robinson v.
California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962); see also Timbs v. Indiana, 139 S. Ct. 682,
686–87 (2019) (finding the Eighth Amendment’s “excessive fines” prohibition as
binding on the states via Fourteenth Amendment Due Process Clause
incorporation).
67
See generally 902 F.3d 1031 (9th Cir. 2018), opinion amended and superseded
on denial of reh’g, 920 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. 2019).
68
Id. at 1048.
69
See id.
70
Id. (quoting Jones v. City of Los Angeles, 444 F.3d 1118, 1136 (9th Cir. 2006),
vacated, 505 F.3d 1006 (9th Cir. 2007)) (internal quotation omitted).
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be criminalized,71 what inevitably follows from being homeless in
public—sitting, lying, or sleeping in public72—cannot under those
circumstances be criminalized either.73
Martin
seeks
minimally
to
distinguish
culpable
homelessness from nonculpable homelessness.
The basic
assumption is that someone who temporarily abandons a viable
residence merely for the purpose of, say, personal amusement,
investigative journalism, to win a frivolous bet, or to test the
limits of the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause may be
culpable in a way that should not apply to at least some more
typical cases of homelessness. But the court in Martin does not
begin to explore the ultimate tenability of any such distinction.74
At a more immediate practical policy level, Martin disclaims
any obligation on the part of any government to provide any
housing on any terms,75 let alone any constitutional right to
housing.76 Rather, the Martin court’s holding is merely that

71

See id. at 1048.
See id.
73
See id. To the contrary, the recent Fourth Circuit case, Manning v. Caldwell,
over a dissent, held that “although states may not criminalize status, they may
criminalize actual behavior even when the individual alleges that addiction created
a strong urge to engage in a particular act.” 900 F.3d 139, 146–47 (4th Cir. 2018),
rev’d and remanded en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). Perhaps more strongly,
Manning also allows for the criminalizing of conduct that is proximately caused by
non-volitional or involuntary acts. See id. at 147. Neither here nor in other cases do
we find a persuasive account of the relationship among addiction, strong or
realistically irresistible desires, non-volitional acts, and criminal responsibility, or
even of the relationships between policy judgments of proximate cause and, say,
deterministic cause in fact. A sharply divided en banc Fourth Circuit reversed the
panel decision on grounds partly of vagueness, but as well on Eighth Amendment
grounds. The en banc majority construed the plaintiffs’ complaint to allege “targeted
criminalization . . . of conduct that is an involuntary manifestation of their illness,
and that is otherwise legal for the general population,” Manning, 930 F.3d at 284,
and thus that depends upon no prior criminal conviction and involves no volitional
element, where the conduct in question is generally lawful for the drinking age
population. See id. The theory therein seems to be that punishing entirely
involuntary conduct can be permissible where that conduct is deemed sufficiently
dangerous as to warrant its general, across the board criminalization for some
broader population. See id.
74
See Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048. The Martin court therein refers to ideas such
as inevitability, unavoidability, and involuntariness, but with no meaningful
clarification.
75
See id.
76
See id. The classic cite to a presumed denial of a federal constitutional right to
housing is Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (finding no “constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality”). Access to housing and
access to housing of some unspecified quality may, however, pose distinct issues.
72
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otherwise nonculpable77 homelessness cannot be punished
consistent with the prohibition against cruel and unusual
punishment.78 And for the court’s purposes, such homelessness
includes its presumably inevitable incidents, including resting on
public property.79
The Martin court pursued questions of inevitability,
unavoidability, and involuntariness only to the limited, and quite
dubious, extent of insisting upon an inquiry into the relation
between the current number of homeless persons in the relevant
jurisdiction and the current number of available beds in that
jurisdiction’s public and private homeless shelters.80 Setting
aside various associated problems, the Martin court concluded
that the Eighth Amendment prohibition of criminal convictions
in this context could be involved, oddly, only when the number of
local homeless persons begins to exceed the number of local
simultaneously available shelter beds.81
Under this rule, the Eighth Amendment’s applicability to
homelessness-related offenses is thus a matter of comparing two
aggregated totals. Very roughly, the crucial comparison is
between the current total objective need for shelter and the
current total supply of shelter within the particular jurisdiction.82
If the former, as an overall total, exceeds the latter, then the
possibility of an Eighth Amendment Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause claim may be available.
This rule raises difficult and important conceptual,
measurement, and policy issues.83 But perhaps the most critical
problem is the absence of any explanation as to why an
77

See unelaborated terms referred to at supra note 74.
See Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048.
79
See id.
80
See id. Martin relied directly at this point on the vacated opinion of Jones,
444 F.3d 1118, 1137–38 (9th Cir. 2006).
81
See Martin, 902 F.3d at 1048, again relying on Jones, 444 F.3d at 1138.
82
See sources cited supra note 81.
83
For example, it is unclear why the nearest and most realistically available
shelter facilities cannot be counted, despite their convenience, if they happen to be in
a convenient neighboring local jurisdiction, rather than in the jurisdiction making
the homelessness arrest. The temptation for any jurisdiction to free ride at the
expense of neighboring jurisdictions, perhaps along with some desire to avoid siting
a homelessness facility in its own “backyard,” may well be widespread. Query also
whether a shelter at which the arrestee has previously been assaulted or robbed
should count toward the number of total available beds. More broadly, consider
issues of personal mobility and public transportation access to one or more of the
shelters being counted toward the total, along with how widely known the existence
of some facilities may be.
78
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individual person’s rights, defenses, moral responsibility, and
ultimate culpability should be crucially determined by any sort of
relative shifting among the overall aggregate totals.
On this Martin-Jones approach, no individual homeless
person can invoke the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause if
there are, however doubtless imperfectly calculated, a thousand
local homeless persons at the same time that there are a
thousand locally available shelter beds. But if one such shelter
bed is then taken out of service, reducing the number of currently
available such beds to 999, then, under the Martin-Jones rule,
the Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause may apparently be
invoked not only by the thousandth arrestee, but, crucially, by
the first and only such arrestee.84
To explore this odd implication of the Martin-Jones test,
suppose that on some given day, only one person was arrested
and charged with a homelessness-related offense. Suppose
further that at the time of that person’s arrest, the most
accessible local shelter was only half full, or was even entirely
unoccupied. Thus, the single arrested person could, in some
sense, have realistically claimed any one of numerous available
shelter beds for that evening, as could any small number of other
potential arrestees have done.
On the logic of the Martin and Jones cases, though, even that
sole arrestee of the day would have been able to invoke the Cruel
and Unusual Punishment Clause based on the odd assumption
that if, contrary to actual fact, all of the local homeless
population had sought local shelter that day, all but one such
person could have been accommodated.85 Any one merely
hypothetically unaccommodated person, whether the single
actual arrestee or not, would trigger Cruel and Unusual
Punishment Clause protection for that single arrestee. So the
first and only arrestee is, in effect, allowed under the
Martin-Jones rule to stand in the shoes of a hypothetical
thousandth arrestee of the day, perhaps the only arrestee out of a
total of a thousand who could not have found shelter space that
day, given the assumed 999 available shelter beds that day.
The Martin-Jones rule, otherwise put, evidently assumes
that even the first and only homeless arrestee of the day was,
constructively, arrested only after the remainder of the homeless
84

See supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
Again, assume here that there are 1,000 homeless persons and 999
realistically available local shelter beds.
85
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population had somehow reserved all the otherwise available
shelter beds. Cruel and Unusual Punishment Clause protection
is available based on even a slight excess of the number of
homeless persons, whether they seek shelter space that day or not,
over the total shelter space.86 The Martin and Jones cases do not
attempt to explain why the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause should not, instead, more realistically be available only to
homeless arrestees who had no realistic choice, or at best only a
limited chance, of finding a local shelter bed.
Suppose, by loose analogy, that we must decide whether to
hold some single student responsible for not boarding the daily
school bus. Assume that all the buses the student might have
caught were only partly full at all relevant times. Would we
nonetheless excuse that nonboarding student if, hypothetically,
some other student would have been unable to board any bus if,
contrary to fact, the students enrolled in the school had fully
occupied all the available bus seats?
Thus, the Martin-Jones rule differs dramatically from a more
intuitive rule that applies the Cruel and Unusual Punishment
Clause only if the claimant can show, with whatever degree of
probability, that no local shelter bed would have been available
for that particular claimant at the time of the arrest.87 Neither
Martin nor Jones attempts to justify its own approach by
comparison with this or with any other more plausible
alternative approaches.

86

See supra text accompanying notes 81–82.
The Martin court, 902 F.3d 1031, 1048, cites a Florida federal district court
opinion in support of its holding. But the very language quoted by Martin explicitly
supports a rule that is in conflict with that adopted in Martin and Jones. The crucial
Pottinger language is that “[a]s long as the homeless plaintiffs do not have a single
place where they can lawfully be, the challenged ordinances . . . punish them for
something for which they may not be convicted under the [E]ighth
[A]mendment . . . .” See Pottinger v. City of Miami, 810 F. Supp. 1551, 1565 (S.D.
Fla. 1992). The Pottinger language thus refers to the availability of shelter for one or
more specific homeless arrestees, rather than to an excess of homeless persons
overall compared to the total of currently available shelter places, even where the
arrestees could readily have taken shelter. As well, a recent paraphrase of the
Martin-Jones rule by the Ninth Circuit itself is actually closer to the Pottinger
formulation above than to the language of the courts in Martin and Jones. See
O’Callaghan v. City of Portland, 736 Fed. App’x 704, 705 (9th Cir. 2018) (“We
recently held that a city ordinance prohibiting individuals from sleeping outside on
public property may violate the Eighth Amendment when enforced against homeless
individuals who have no access to alternative shelter.”).
87
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Broadly, then, none of the homelessness-related cases88
sheds much light on basic individual, collective, and institutional
rights and responsibilities in the context of homelessness. The
cases seek to distinguish between homelessness-related
conditions or acts, whether they are thought of as voluntary or
not, that can legitimately be criminalized, and those conditions or
acts that cannot be legitimately criminalized.89 This ongoing
project has, however, been plainly unsuccessful.
Crucially, the case law disturbingly recognizes that “[e]very
criminal act can be alleged to be the result of some compulsion.
If human behavior is viewed as something over which human
beings lack control, and for which they are not responsible,
the implications are boundless.”90
The case law on
homelessness-related offenses, whether drawing upon other
areas of case law or on legal scholarship, or neither, has not even
begun to address, let alone resolve this and related basic
problems.
The evident failure of the homelessness case law to
meaningfully address its own basic logic, implications, and
justifiability is of obvious importance. We might imagine,
though, that while the criminalized homelessness case law does
not adequately justify itself, some justification for this case law
might be imported from outside the case law. The natural place
to look for meaningful justifications and critique of the
criminalized homelessness case law would be in the leading
philosophical
discussions
of
responsibility,
culpability,
blameworthiness, punishment and punishability, compulsion,
determinism and randomness, freedom of the will in various
senses, and of voluntary and involuntary acts.
Our best contemporary philosophers have indeed produced
substantial literature discussing these matters. As it turns out,
though, the range and variety of the fundamental and persisting

88
The Manning case contributes by at least recognizing the problem in this
context of slippery slope arguments. See Manning v. Caldwell, 900 F.3d 139, 148
(4th Cir. 2018), rev’d and remanded en banc, 930 F.3d 264 (4th Cir. 2019). On some
intricacies of slippery slope arguments, see generally Frederick Schauer, Slippery
Slopes, 99 HARV. L. REV. 361, 361 (1985); Eugene Volokh, The Mechanisms of the
Slippery Slope, 116 HARV. L. REV. 1026, 1030 (2003).
89
See sources cited supra notes 81–82.
90
Manning, 900 F.3d at 148; see also, e.g., Michael J. Zimmerman, Varieties of
Moral Responsibility, in THE NATURE OF MORAL RESP.: NEW ESSAYS 45 (Randolph
Clarke, Michael McKenna & Angela M. Smith eds., 2018) (2015) (“There is a
burgeoning literature on the nature of moral responsibility.”).
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disagreements among leading scholars undermine any realistic
possibility of clearly justifying one legal approach to
homelessness-related criminality over another.
The most
sophisticated approaches to moral and legal responsibility, in
general and as applied to homelessness-related offenses, are
fundamentally conflicting and mutually irreconcilable.91
The basic disputes over responsibility, freedom, culpability,
and the like are expressed through a variety of technical and
semi-technical concepts.
The fundamental and apparently
irreconcilable contradictions are, however, evident to all.92 Most
basically, the leading contemporary philosophers are deadlocked
over the actual descriptive role in the world, if any, of various
kinds of determinism; of luck, chance, and randomness; and of
various forms and strengths of freedom of the will.93 The leading
philosophers are then, independently, also hopelessly deadlocked
on the normative or prescriptive implications of any possible
roles of determinism, luck, or randomness for questions of

91
See Zimmerman, supra note 90, at 45 (“Many of these claims appear to
conflict with one another.”) (citing several important general instances). For an
introduction to the much more complex problem of the long term effects of belief in
free will on the presumed morality of one’s character, see generally Damien L. Crone
& Neil L. Levy, Are Free Will Believers Nicer People (Four Studies Suggest Not), 1
SOC. PSYCH. & PERSONALITY SCI. 1 (2018); Stephen Cave, There’s No Such Thing as
Free Will But We’re Better Off Believing in It Anyway, THE ATLANTIC (June 2016),
www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/2016/06/theres-no-such-thing.
92
See, for a mere hint of the unresolved contradictions, ROBERT LOCKIE, FREE
WILL AND EPISTEMOLOGY: A DEFENCE OF THE TRANSCENDENTAL ARGUMENT FOR
FREEDOM 4 (2018) (“[W]ere determinism true, the determinist would lack epistemic
justification for holding this view or maintaining this claim.”); id. at 180–81; DERK
PEREBOOM, FREE WILL, AGENCY, AND MEANING IN LIFE 199 (2014) (“If we did give
up the assumption of the sort of free will at issue [sufficient for moral responsibility],
then, perhaps surprisingly, we might be better off as a result.”); Susan Blackmore,
Living Without Free Will, in EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL
RESP. 161, 162 (Gregg D. Caruso ed., 2013) (“[W]e humans are clever
decision-making machines that are prone to a number of powerful illusions, in
particular the illusion of a persisting inner self with consciousness and free
will . . . .”) (internal citation omitted); Neil Levy, Be a Skeptic, Not a Metaskeptic, in
EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL RESP. 87, 87 (Gregg D. Caruso
ed., 2013) (arguing that due to either “present luck” or “constitutive luck,” “agents
are never morally responsible for their actions”); Galen Strawson, The Impossibility
of Ultimate Responsibility?, in EXPLORING THE ILLUSION OF FREE WILL AND MORAL
RESP. 41, 51 (Gregg D. Caruso ed., 2013) (“[H]owever self-consciously aware we are
as we deliberate and reason, every act and operation of our mind happens as it does
as a result of features for which we are ultimately in no way responsible.”).
93
See the authorities cited supra note 92. Query in particular whether genuine
rationality-driven choice-making can actually take place under determinism or in
the absence of libertarian free will.
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criminal responsibility, culpability, and punishment.94 And then
finally, it should hardly surprise us that the philosophers are
also hopelessly deadlocked over even the basic implications of
their views for our general legal institutions of criminal
adjudication and the disposition of offenders.95
At the level of practice, a limited number of the philosophers
have indeed converged on at least some broad outlines of what
we might call a disease quarantine analogy;96 perhaps
supplemented by some forms of prevention, rehabilitation, cure,
counseling, redistribution of resources, training, education, and
broader social justice reform.97 These latter quarantine-plussocial-justice theorists often assume some sort of collective right
to self-protection, and protection of the basic health and safety
interests of other persons, in justifying their analogy to
compulsory quarantines of contagious disease carriers in the
public health context.98
The intended progressivism, humaneness, and benevolence
of these quarantine models of criminal justice institutions is
clear. But unfortunately, equally capable philosophers have
expressed serious doubts as to the coherence, as well as to the
likely long-term benevolence in practice, of any version of a
quarantine-based theory.99 One obvious problem is that if crime
94

See authorities cited supra note 92.
See authorities cited supra note 92.
96
See, e.g., DERK PEREBOOM, LIVING WITHOUT FREE WILL 186 (2001) (referring
to an “analogy with our rationale for quarantining carriers of dangerous diseases”);
Gregg D. Caruso, The Public Health-Quarantine Model, OXFORD HANDBOOK OF
MORAL RESP. (forthcoming), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3068021 (November 14,
2017); Luis E. Chiesa, Punishing Without Free Will, 2011 UTAH L. REV. 1403, 1409.
Perhaps the most extensive development of a quarantine analogy and related social
reforms is by Professor Bruce Waller. See, e.g., BRUCE N. WALLER, AGAINST MORAL
RESP. 293–95 (2011); BRUCE N. WALLER, THE INJUSTICE OF PUNISHMENT (2018).
97
See the sources cited supra note 96.
98
See, e.g., Gregg D. Caruso, Free Will Skepticism and Its Implications: An
Argument for Optimism, FREE WILL SKEPTICISM IN L. AND SOC’Y 10 (forthcoming),
https://ssrn.com/abstract=2758311 (April 3, 2016) (“[T]he right to harm in selfdefense and defense of others justifies incapacitating the criminally dangerous with
the minimum harm required for adequate protection.”); see also Gregg D. Caruso,
Skepticism About Moral Responsibility, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHIL. (Jan. 18,
2018), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/skepticism-moral-responsibility.
99
See, most fundamentally, the works of Professor Saul Smilansky, and in
particular Saul Smilansky, Review of Bruce N. Waller, The Injustice of Punishment,
Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews (Oct. 21, 2018), https://ndpr.nd.edu/news/theinjustice-of-punishment (“[C]an [moral responsibility] denialists resist the constant
temptations for the efficient management of people . . . ?”); Saul Smilansky, Free
Will and Respect for Persons, 29 MIDWEST STUD. IN PHIL. 248, 259 (2005) (“Value
and meaning are inherently connected to the idea of free and responsible agency.”);
95
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at the level of the individual or group is sufficiently predictable,
preventing future criminality in a cost-effective way may seem
more sensible than unnecessarily allowing the crime and its
harms to occur, even if this requires sustained pre-crime
confinement, or even involuntary medical treatment of one sort
or another.100
It thus seems reasonable to conclude that neither the
homelessness-related case law, nor the most relevant and most
sophisticated philosophical discussions, can provide a minimally
convincing account of criminal responsibility in the context of
homelessness and homelessness-related offenses. The typical
current criminal penalty of confining the convicted homeless
defendant to some sort of housing for a substantial period is,
in our homelessness-related cases, ironic, if not paradoxical.
Commonly, the homelessness-related offense stems precisely
from the homeless person’s unfulfilled wish for housing on a
sustained basis. Incarceration can be a sort of degradingly odd
parody-response to that understandable wish.
Thus, in a sense, the state responds to what it stigmatizes as
criminally culpable conduct by itself providing the convicted
defendant with a curious version of what the defendant
presumably sought or felt deprived of. It is thus left unclear why
officially providing some parody-like form of what the defendant
culpably sought is actually an appropriate governmental
response. Nor, certainly, is it clear why penologically housing a
homeless person should depend upon whether we think of the
homeless person’s offense as a matter of their status or of their
conduct.101

Saul Smilansky, Hard Determinism and Punishment: A Practical Reductio, 30 L. &
PHIL. 353, 354 (2011) (arguing that in abandoning traditional punishment, hard
determinists are instead logically committed to counterintuitive practices that
Smilansky refers to as “funishment”); Saul Smilansky, Pereboom On Punishment:
Funishment, Innocence, Motivation, and Other Difficulties, 11 CRIM. L. & PHIL. 591,
602 (2016); Saul Smilansky, The Time to Punish, 54 ANALYSIS 50, 50 (1994) (arguing
against the logic of pre-punishment, or the disinclination to wait until an offense has
actually been committed before isolating the eventual offender, as in some cases of a
reformed system of preventive detention). For further discussion of the logic of
pre-punishment in appropriate cases, see the articles collected in 68 ANALYSIS
250–63 (2008).
100
See the authorities cited supra note 99; Michael Louis Corrado, Punishment
and the Burden of Proof, www.ssrn.com/abstract=2997654 (2017); John Lemos,
Moral Concern About Responsibility Denial and the Quarantine of Violent Criminals,
35 L. & PHIL. 461 (2016).
101
See supra notes 12–65 and accompanying text.
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In the end, the efforts of judges and scholars of all sorts to
provide any persuasive approach to the criminalization of
homelessness-related conditions and activities have been
perennially unsuccessful. It is thus difficult, if not impossible, to
justify any stance toward this set of criminal cases, where the
ironies, paradoxes, basic conflicts, and dead ends regularly
appear more directly, more clearly, more starkly, and more
inescapably than in typical non-homelessness-related cases.
If the deep and apparently intractable basic problems of
criminal culpability in homelessness-related cases cannot be
persuasively resolved, they can, on our approach, at least
be practically bypassed. Recognizing an enforceable federal
constitutional right to housing, however formulated, would allow
for such a practical bypass. After all, there can generally be no
criminalization of that to which we have an enforceable
constitutional right.
The case for a federal constitutional right to at least some
minimal sort of housing requires, however, our recognizing that
officially adopted government policies of various sorts, are
among the substantial and important continuing causes of
homelessness. Governments ironically continue to criminalize
conditions and activities to which governments themselves
systematically and pervasively causally contribute.
II. PUBLIC POLICY AS ITSELF A CRUCIAL CAUSE OF
HOMELESSNESS AND INEVITABLE HOMELESSNESS-RELATED
OFFENSES
Even when treated as an administrative matter rather than
a more serious criminal matter, the homelessness cases typically
distort public discussion by distracting attention from the crucial
roles of government, at all levels, in causally generating the
status or conduct at issue in such cases. But even if the focus of
attention remains initially on the homeless parties, rather than
on official policy as causal, some minimal progress can be made
by expanding the standard criminal case analysis. Whether
successfully or unsuccessfully, a homeless defendant might
reasonably seek to raise a defense of necessity,102 thereby at least
102
See R. GEORGE WRIGHT, DOES THE LAW MORALLY BIND THE POOR? 105, 106
(1996). See also generally Michele Cotton, The Necessity Defense and the Moral
Limits of Law, 18 NEW CRIM. L. REV. 35 (2015); Dionne Cordell-Whitney, Jury Will
Hear Pipeline Protester’s Necessity Defense, COURTHOUSE NEWS SERV. (July 18,
2018), www.courthousenews.com/jury-will-hear-pipeline (discussing a Minnesota
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beginning to point to the homeless defendant’s broader
circumstances. Raising, however unsuccessfully, a defense of
entrapment103 might also provoke reflection on governmental
roles in causally generating homelessness and the inevitably
resulting homelessness-related offenses. And there is even a
sense in which we might think of governments as complicitous, if
not also a technical accomplice or an accessory,104 to a
homelessness-related crime.
But we can hardly understand homelessness, and any
resulting related offenses, until we understand the typically
unintended causal contributions, direct and indirect, of a number
of official policies adopted at one governmental level or another.
We need not here attempt to answer the broad and complex105
question of precisely what conditions cause homelessness.106 Our
court ruling allowing a climate-related necessity defense regarding oil pipeline
activism); Antonia K. Fassinelli, Note, In re Eichorn: The Long-Awaited
Implementation of the Necessity Defense in a Case of the Criminalization of
Homelessness, 50 AM. U.L. REV. 323, 324 (2000).
103
For a brief mainstream account of the entrapment defense and its
limitations, see Entrapment-Elements, U.S. DEP’T JUSTICE (last visited Aug. 7,
2019), www.justice.gov/jm/criminal-resource-manual-645-entrapment-elements.
104
For a thoughtful recent discussion, see generally Sherif Girgis, Note, The
Mens Rea of Accomplice Liability: Supporting Intentions, 126 YALE L.J. 460 (2013).
105
For a brief but useful treatment of the crucial problems posed by “causal
density,” see Jim Manzi, What Social Science Does—and Doesn’t—Know, CITY J.
(Summer 2010), https://www.city-journal.org/html/what-social-science-does—anddoesn’t—know-13297.html.
106
Accounts of the most important causes of homelessness, with or without
implicating government policies, tend toward consensus, along with a sense that
these causes may have interactive and compounding effects. The National Law
Center on Homelessness and Poverty cites “insufficient income and lack of
affordable housing,” domestic violence, unemployment, mental illness, and
substance abuse. See Homelessness in America: Overview of Data and Causes, NAT’L
L. CTR. ON HOMELESSNESS & POVERTY (January 2015), https://nlchp.org/wpcontent/uploads/2018/10/Homeless_Stats_Fact_Sheet.pdf; see also Exploring the
Crisis of Unsheltered Homelessness, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS (June
20, 2018), https://endhomelessness.org/exploring-crisis-unsheltered-homelessness;
Barrett A. Lee et al., The New Homelessness Revisited, 36 ANN. REV. SOC. 501,
509–10 (2010) (referring to, for example, limited supplies of affordable housing,
abuse and neglect as a child, poverty, family conflict, alcohol and drug abuse, mental
illness, domestic violence, and discharge from some form of institutionalized
residence setting); Homelessness Response: The Roots of the Crisis, CITY OF SEATTLE
(last visited Aug, 7, 2019), www.seattle.gov/homelessness/the-roots-of-the-crisis
(specifying, inter alia, health issues, unemployment, domestic violence, mental
illness, addiction, poverty, lack of affordable housing, and racial inequities). For a
demographic breakdown of homelessness, see The 2017 Annual Homeless
Assessment Report (AHAR) to Congress, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB. DEV.
(December 2017), https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2017-AHARPart-1.pdf, at 8–9.
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focus is instead on governmental and legal causal contributions
to the phenomena of homelessness and resulting crimes.
Ironically, government policy can increase homelessness and
homelessness-related crime not only unintentionally, or
indifferently, but precisely in attempting to address problems of
homelessness. The fancy term for this unfortunate causal
phenomenon would be “iatrogenic etiology.”107
This term
generally refers to causing some undesirable phenomenon, which
is not a goal of the affected person, in attempting to treat some
other related or unrelated malady. While iatrogenic causation is
most commonly discussed in medical contexts,108 the basic idea
has been extended broadly109 to non-medical contexts.110
Policy-based iatrogenic causation can overlap with the broader

107
With ‘etiology’ referring, for our purposes, to the causation of a condition.
See the discussion in Iatrogenesis, WIKIPEDIA (last visited Aug. 7, 2019),
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Iatrogenesis.
108
See, e.g., N.R. Krishnan & A.S. Kasthuri, Iatrogenic Disorders, 61 MED. J.
ARMED FORCES INDIA 2, 2 (2005) (“Iatrogenic disease is the result of diagnostic and
therapeutic procedures undertaken on a patient.”); Trisha Torrey, Iatrogenic
Events During Medical Treatments, VERYWELL HEALTH (Jan. 21, 2019),
https://www.verywellhealth.com/what-is-iatrogenic-2615180. One might think of
transmitting an infection to a hospital patient by means of an unsanitary item of
medical equipment used in his or her treatment.
109
For a broadening of the scope of discussion, though still with medical
reference, see Iatrogenesis, ENCYCLOPEDIA (last visited Aug. 7, 2019),
https://www.encyclopedia.com/social-sciences/dictionaries-thesauruses-pictures-andpress-releases/iatrogenesis (discussing the relatively narrow scope of clinical
iatrogenesis, as well as the progressively broader concepts of “social iatrogenesis”
and “cultural iatrogenesis”).
110
See the especially interesting discussion by John Horgan, The Curse of
Iatrogenesis: When “Cures” Make Us Sicker, SCI. AM. (July 18, 2011),
https://blogs.scientificamerican.com/cross-check/the-curse-of-iatrogenesis-whencures-make-us-sicker/, referring in particular to the injuries caused, rather than
avoided or minimized, by the use of hard plastic football helmets.
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phenomenon of perverse unintended consequences111 of
government policies.112
Perhaps the most popular example of a housing policy with
unintended, if not also unforeseen, unattractive consequences for
homelessness is that of legal controls on rental prices of moderate
to lower income residential apartment units.113 While typical
rent control regulations may be intended to help renters in
general, the main positive effects actually may be concentrated
on those lucky enough to be the currently existing tenants,114 and

111
For classic discussions, see Frederic Bastiat, That Which is Seen, and That
Which is Not Seen, BASTIAT (originally published July 1850), http://bastiat.org/
en/twisatwins.html; Robert K. Merton, The Unanticipated Consequences of Purposive
Social Action, 1 AM. SOC. REV. 894, 894 (1936). For a brief recent overview, see Rob
Norton, Unintended Consequences, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (last visited Aug. 7,
2019), www.econlib.org/library/Enc/UnintendedConsequences.html. For a number of
possible contemporary instances, see Mark J. Perry, Ten Examples of the Law of
Unintended Consequences, AEI: CARPE DIEM (Nov. 19, 2013), http://www.aei.org/
publication/ten-examples-of-the-law-of-unintended-consequences/. For a contribution
directly addressing housing policy, prices, and homelessness, see Adam B. Summers,
Rent Control, Prop. 10, and the Law of Unintended Consequences, INDEP. INST. (Oct.
29, 2018), www.independent.org/news/article.asp?id=10582.
112
A policy may not be strictly intended to increase homelessness, where the
increased homelessness is nevertheless clearly foreseen, and perhaps regretted, by
some proponents of the policy in question. A policy might have consequences that
strongly appeal to its proponents, such as to outweigh, in their minds, predictable
indirect or long-term effects on the homeless population. Consider the policies
addressed infra notes 113–159 and accompanying text.
113
For discussion, see HENRY HAZLITT, ECON. IN ONE LESSON ch. 18 (1988),
available at http://steshaw.org/economics-in-one-lesson/chap18p1.html; Walter
Block, Rent Control, LIBR. ECON. & LIBERTY (last visited Aug. 7, 2019),
http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/RentControl.html; Rebecca Diamond, What Does
Economic Evidence Tell Us About the Effects of Rent Control?, BROOKINGS (Oct.
18, 2018), https://www.brookings.edu/research/what-does-economic-evidence-tell-usabout-the-effects-of-rent-control/; Rebecca Diamond et al., The Effects of Rent Control
Expansion on Tenants, Landlords, and Inequality: Evidence From San Francisco,
CATO INST. (Apr. 18, 2018), https://www.cato.org/publications/research-briefseconomic-policy/effects-rent-control-expansion-tenants-landlords; Mark J. Perry, Due
to Rent Control, S.F. Has 31,000 Vacant Housing Units As Frustrated Landlords
Give Up, CARPE DIEM (May 7, 2011), http://mjperry.blogspot.com/2011/05/because-ofrent-control-sf-has-31000.html. Some of the basic economic effects of such rent
control programs were recently discussed in the context of the campaigns for and
against California’s statewide ballot Proposition 10. See Summers, supra note 111;
Melody Gutierrez, Prop. 10: California Rent Control Expansion Defeated,
S.F. CHRON. (Nov. 6, 2018), https://www.sfchronicle.com/politics/article/Prop-10California-rent-control-expansion-13369284.php?psid=cqPwe; see also Christian
Britschgi, Oregon Likely to Become the First in the Nation to Adopt Statewide Rent
Control, REASON (Jan. 18, 2019), https://reason.com/2019/01/18/oregon-likely-tobecome-the-first-in-the.
114
See Diamond, supra note 113, at 1.
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even then only in the short run.115 Thus it has been argued that
“[w]hile rent control appears to help current tenants in the
short run, in the long run it decreases affordability, fuels
gentrification, and creates negative spillovers on the surrounding
neighborhood.”116
Once we see rent control in a dynamic, rather than a merely
static or fixed, context, we can see how persons might rationally
respond to the incentives established by typical rent control
regimes. Landlords might commonly disinvest over time in rent
controlled properties, in favor of other sorts of real property not
subject to price control.117
Landlords may recognize little
incentive to invest in moderate income apartment unit repairs,
maintenance, and the general livability of rent controlled housing
units.118 And certainly, landlords may have little incentive to
build new, additional moderate or low-cost housing if it will, or
even later may, be subject to below-market rent controls.119
Interestingly, though, it is difficult to empirically prove any
clear and direct relationship120 between typical rent control
regimes and the severity of the local homelessness problem.121 Of
course, rigorous and decisive demonstrations in the social
sciences tend in general to be difficult to arrive at.122 Other
factors may obscure or confound any relationship between
residential rent control and homelessness.123 Still, the absence of
a clear correlation in this respect may surprise those who think

115

See id.
Id.
117
See Diamond et al., supra note 113.
118
See HAZLITT, supra note 113. There may thus be, over time, “no
incentive . . . to keep existing low-income housing in good repair.” Id. The effects of
chronic housing disrepair on homelessness, as incentivized by the rent control
regulations at issue in a given case, would accrue only over time.
119
See id.
120
Note the inherent complications addressed in Manzi, supra note 105.
121
See Lisa Sturtevant, The Impacts of Rent Control: A Research Review and
Synthesis, NMHC RES. FOUND. (May 2018), https://www.nmhc.org/globalassets/
knowledge-library/rent-control-literature-review-final2.pdf 18 (“There is no
consistent relationship observed between rent control and the prevalence of
homelessness.”); see also Dirk W. Early & Edgar O. Olsen, Rent Control and
Homelessness, 28 REGIONAL SCI. & URB. ECON. 797 (1998) (“We cannot reject the
hypothesis that rent control has no net effect on homelessness.”); Paul W. Grimes &
George A. Chressanthis, Assessing the Effect of Rent Control on Homelessness, 41 J.
URB. ECON. 23 (1997) (“[R]ent control is a positive, although relatively small,
determinant of a city’s shelter and street populations.”).
122
See Manzi, supra note 105.
123
See id.
116
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of, say, San Francisco and Los Angeles for their residential rent
control programs as well as for the scope of their homelessness
problems.124
On the other hand, we know that rent control may well
create a class of “winners,” at least in the short run, in the form
of existing tenants who cannot now be subjected to substantial
rate increases.125
Some of those protected tenants might
otherwise have become homeless. Their housing units may have
deteriorated in quality over time,126 but still remained habitable.
This group of otherwise homeless tenants may at least partially
offset the persons more adversely affected, over the long term, by
typical rent control regimes.
Two other considerations may help to account for the lack of
a clear and strong relationship between rent control policies and
homelessness. First is a recognition that government policies
affecting homelessness rates create incentives to which all
parties may strategically respond over time. Persons who are or
may become homeless can often respond to changes in incentives,
costs, and available alternatives.127 Any adverse effects of rent
control on homelessness rates will thus be mitigated, if not
entirely negated, by any number of adaptive responses. These
adaptive responses could include moving into otherwise
unattractive family living arrangements, or leaving the
geographical jurisdiction entirely.128 Both of these responses may
reduce local homelessness rates.
Second, it would hardly be surprising if a rent controlling
jurisdiction also adopted other regulations having the
counteracting effect of reducing homelessness rates below where
they would otherwise be.129
And there is certainly no
requirement that the relevant government recognize that the
offsetting program was made more necessary because of that
government’s own rent control program. The response to any
adverse effect of any governmental regulation, after all, may be

124
Consider the predominance of rent controlled cities in the discussion at supra
notes 113 and 159 and accompanying text.
125
For discussion, see the authorities cited supra note 113.
126
See authorities cited supra note 113.
127
See generally ALBERT O. HIRSCHMAN, EXIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY 51 (1970).
128
Leaving the rent controlling jurisdiction may require moving only a minimal
distance geographically.
129
Among the latter responses will be homeless persons who move to a
jurisdiction without rent control, but who remain homeless.
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the adoption of a separate, compensatory regulation, or any
number thereof.130 The offsetting regulation may or may not be
specifically targeted toward reducing local homelessness rates.131
More broadly, though, homelessness rates are affected, often
adversely, by a number of official government policies ranging far
beyond direct residential rent control. Some policies may be
intended to reduce homelessness and have either positive or
unexpectedly negative actual effects in that regard.132 Other
policies adversely affect local homelessness rates, perhaps
foreseeably so, but without the government’s explicitly seeking or
desiring such effects.133
Construction, land use, growth and developmental, zoning,
public health, and housing regulations in general may have
adverse effects on the availability of low cost housing that might
reduce local homelessness rates.134 In large measure, opposition
to the most affordable housing policy options reflects ordinary
democratic processes, administrative agency processes, and
judicial trials and appeals, all as reflected in governmental
policies reducing the otherwise available supply of the least
expensive housing units.135 Governments thus again cause, and
bear responsibility for, homelessness and its incidence.

130
See, e.g., Barak Orbach, What Is Government Failure?, 30 YALE J. REG.
ONLINE 44 (2013), http://yalejreg.com/what-is-government-failure.
131
See Sturtevant, supra note 121, at 18 (noting that rent control programs
have broad direct effects far beyond homeless persons, whereas programs intended
to reduce homelessness can be more narrowly targeted).
132
See Alison McIntrye, Doctrine of Double Effect, STAN. ENCYCLOPEDIA PHIL.
(Spring 2019), https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/double-effect.
133
As pervades the distinction between specifically intended or hoped for
consequences and consequences that were merely foreseen or reasonably foreseeable,
and in some sense even considered mildly regrettable. Id.
134
See, e.g., Michael Hendrix, California Housing Revolution?, CITY J., (Feb. 21,
2018),
https://www.city-journal.org/html/california-housing-revolution-15731.html
(“[T]he poor . . . are demanding shelter only to find its supply limited by stringent
regulations.”); Aaron M. Renn, Heating Up a Housing Crisis, CITY J., (May 15, 2018),
http://www.city-journal.org/html/heating-housing-crisis-15905.html
(“Regulations
that stifle building are a big part of the problem.”).
135
For a very concise but broad ranging summary, see Matt Levin, 5 Reasons
California’s Housing Costs Are So High, KQED, (May 4, 2018), http://www.kqed.org/
news/11666284/5-reasons-californias (citing, among other considerations, multiple
layers of review for housing projects, not-in-my-backyard (“NIMBY”) based
objections at a local city council level, local growth controls, and multi-year delays
even for environmentally friendly projects resulting from required environmental
impact assessments).
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In particular, local residents, homeowners, and landowners
may have a substantial interest in preventing increased housing,
and especially the lowest income-oriented housing, from reaching
the market. Local residents may have a compelling incentive to
utilize, or exploit, multiple avenues in delaying or discouraging
such construction.136 It is often assumed that a chronic scarcity
of housing, particularly of housing accessible to low-level income
persons, helps to maintain a major source of wealth for middle
class residents in the form of the sustained or enhanced market
value of their residences and neighborhoods.137
In contrast, homeless persons within or outside the
jurisdiction may typically be far less capable than other local
residents of voting in accordance with their interests, of lobbying
or donating to campaigns, and even of testifying in multiple
forums.138 Low-income housing construction that might affect
local homelessness rates can be opposed at the initial proposal
and planning stages, and through administrative and judicial
filings and appeals.139 By one estimate, in some jurisdictions
there may be as many as twenty distinct official avenues for such
opposition and delay.140
And the cost of pursuing an
administrative or legal objection to a proposed project, and the
costs to the potential developers, over a period of years,141 may be
136

See, e.g., Kriston Capps, Blame Zoning, Not Tech, for San Francisco’s
Housing Crisis, CITYLAB, (Mar. 11, 2016), https://www.citylab.com/equity/2016/03/
are-wealthy-neighborhoods-to-blame-for-gentrification-of-poorer-ones/473349/
(“[R]esidents work tirelessly to prevent more housing from being built.”).
137
See Paavo Monkkonen & Will Livesley-O’Neill, Overcoming Opposition to
New Housing, UCLA LEWIS CTR. FOR REGIONAL POL’Y STUD., (2017),
http://www.lewis.ucla.edu/opposition-to-new-housing; James Pethokoukis, California
Has a Housing Crisis and Can’t Figure Out How to Solve It, RICOCHET, (Oct. 23,
2018),
https://ricochet.com/565600/california-has-a-housing-crisis
(“ ‘[E]xisting
homeowners do not want more affordable homes: they want the value of their asset
to cost more, not less.’ ” quoting Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic
Implications of Housing Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. (2018)).
138
See Edward Glaeser & Joseph Gyourko, The Economic Implications of
Housing Supply, 32 J. ECON. PERSPS. 3, 5 (2018).
139
See Monkkonen & Livesley-O’Neill, supra note 137; Adam Brinklow, San
Francisco Delays Mission Housing Over Potentially Historic Laundromat, CURBED,
(Feb. 14, 2018), https://sf.curbed.com/2018/2/14/17012606/laundromat.
140
See Monkkonen, supra note 137.
141
See Glaeser & Gyourko, supra note 138, at 7; see also Chang-Tai Hsieh &
Enrico Moretti, How Local Housing Regulations Smother the U.S. Economy,
N.Y. TIMES (Sept. 6, 2017), http://www.nytimes.com/2017/09/06/opinion/housingregulations-us-economy.html (arguing that the administrative and judicial processes
can operate so as to give any interested party what amounts to a protracted veto
over any proposed housing project, regardless of the project’s potential effect on
homelessness rates).
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systematically lower than the costs of seeking to complete a
project that may well not turn out to be profitable even if
completed in a timely fashion.142 This again amounts to a set of
government practices that are predictably skewed toward
increasing homelessness.
This is not to suggest that opponents of projects that might
reduce homelessness rely on mere economic self-interest
arguments when seeking to influence the political,
administrative, legal, and judicial response to such projects.143
Opposition can instead focus on concerns as to infrastructure,
strain on utilities, traffic in general, environmental effects,
historic cultural preservation, building safety,144 increased
pedestrian crowding and congestion perhaps even along with
anticipated increases in petty crimes,145 and even to the fair, free,
relaxed use by all persons of public streets and other common
spaces.146
Whatever the appeal of any of these arguments and
concerns, it is clear that rates of homelessness depend in
meaningful part on the often predictably skewed processes and
outcomes of official government law and policymaking. The
branch, level, and geographic scope of such governmental
activities may vary from neighborhood planning boards all the
way up to broadly applicable federal policies.147 Inescapably,
though, government action, in all jurisdictions and at all levels,
often causes homelessness, whether intentionally or not. And
with causally important government policymaking comes,

142

See generally authorities cited supra notes 137–141.
See, e.g., First Lutheran Church v. City of St. Paul, 2018 WL 3762560 at *2
(D. Minn. Aug. 8, 2018); Ginia Bellaphante, Fighting Back Against the War on
Homeless Shelters, N.Y. TIMES (July 20, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/07/
20/nyregion/fighting-back-against-the-war-on-homeless-shelters.html; Jeremy
Waldron, Homelessness and Community, 50 U. TORONTO L.J. 371, 373 (2000).
144
See Bellaphante, supra note 143.
145
See First Lutheran Church, 2018 WL 3762560 at *2.
146
Professor Waldron reports this argument in the context of homeless persons
without meaningful shelter. See Waldron, supra note 143, at 373. Ironically, though,
similar “livability” concerns could be raised with respect to any government policy
that geographically concentrates previously homeless persons in any type of
meaningful housing.
147
Such governmental policies thus can involve any level of any government,
from local planning commissions and zoning boards to federal housing subsidy policy
choices. See, e.g., Vanessa Brown Calder, The Human Cost of Zoning Regulation,
CATO INST., (Nov. 2, 2017), www.cato.org/blog/human-cost-zoning-regulation.
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inescapably, government responsibility.148
This government
causal responsibility encompasses what is referred to as the
“iatrogenic etiology”149 of homelessness, through government
action, or a set of government policies, at all levels.
Governments also attempt, certainly, to compensate for their
own homelessness-inducing policies with occasional efforts to
mitigate the policies’ effects and to address non-governmental
causes of homelessness. Some of these attempts may be only
partially effective, largely ineffective, or even counterproductive.
In particular, governments have attempted to reduce
homelessness, or the adverse effects thereof, by means such as
providing housing subsidy vouchers,150 public housing and tax
credits,151 specially targeted taxes,152 and by emphasizing the
provision of housing itself prior to addressing related issues of
health, disability, mental illness, or addiction.153 Recently, for
example, the City of San Jose has experimented with paying
twenty-five homeless persons $15 dollars per hour for four to five
hours a day to pick up street litter.154 Technology-intensive
148
For a general argument from sufficient state responsibility to the presence of
sufficient state action for various purposes, see R. George Wright, State Action and
State Responsibility, 23 SUFFOLK U.L. REV. 685 (1989). Herein, we make a loosely
similar argument, while at the same time emphasizing that the state’s activities
affecting homelessness clearly establish the state’s moral, and ultimately
constitutional, responsibility to meaningfully address homelessness as a societal
condition.
149
See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
150
See, e.g., Conor Dougherty, Why Rent Control Is a Lightning Rod, N.Y. TIMES
(Oct. 12, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/12/business/economy/rent-controlexplained.html.
151
See id.
152
See, e.g., San Francisco, California, Proposition C, Gross Receipts Tax for
Homelessness Services, BALLOTPEDIA, (Nov. 2018), https://ballotpedia.org/San_
Francisco,_California,_Proposition_C,_Gross_Receipts_Tax_for_Homelessness_Servi
ces_(November_2018); Kate Conger, In Liberal San Francisco, Tech Leaders Brawl
Over Tax Proposal to Aid Homeless, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 19, 2018),
https://www.nytimes.com/2018/10/19/technology/san-francisco-taxes-homeless.html;
Jonathan O’Connell & Gregory Scruggs, After Amazon Opposition, Seattle Passes
Compromise Tax to Fund Homeless Services, WASH. POST (May 14, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/business/economy/after-amazon-opposition-seattlepasses-compromise-tax-to-fund-homeless-services/2018/05/14/2a7732a2-57b6-11e88836-a4a123c359ab_story.html?utm_term=.413d48425111.
153
See John M. Glionna, Utah Is Winning the War on Chronic Homelessness
With ‘Housing First’ Program, L.A. TIMES (May 24, 2015), www.latimes.com/
nation/la-na-utah-housing-first-20150524-story.html.
154
See Alix Martichoux, San Jose Will Pay Homeless People $15 an Hour to Pick
Up Trash, S.F. GATE, (Oct. 25, 2018), https://www.sfgate.com/local/article/San-Josetrash-pick-up-litter-homeless-job-program-13336666.php. For a sense of possible
unintended effects, see, for example, Shaila Dewan, Moral Hazard: A Tempest-
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approaches as well have been introduced, linking homeless
persons with multiple social service agencies in real time.155
Practical barriers to the use of shelter space have been identified,
if not always remedied.156 These practical barriers include prior
adverse experiences at a shelter, time limits on occupancy per
day or on initial eligibility for residency itself, single gender
limits, and required sobriety or participation in faith-oriented
activities.157 Adjusting these policies at government-sponsored or
subsidized shelters could mitigate some homelessness related
problems, even while adding to shelter overcrowding in the short
term.158
In sum, government policy at all levels has been deeply
involved in causally creating, mitigating, and exacerbating
homelessness and its associated pathologies. Commonly, though,
official policy efforts to address homelessness are then limited in
their effects, both favorable and adverse, by the operations of the
democratic political process.159 Overall, the combination of
governments’ causal contributions to the continuing problem of
homelessness and the systematic inadequacies of governmental
policy responses160 to homelessness justify significant attention to
the idea of a federal constitutional right to housing. A focus on
Tossed Idea, N.Y. TIMES (February 25 2012), www.nytimes.com/2012/02/26/
business/moral-hazard-as-the-flip-side-of-self-reliance.html.
155
See Aria Bendix, San Francisco’s Out-of-Control Homelessness Crisis
Could Be Combated by a New Tracking Tool, BUS. INSIDER, (Sept. 4, 2018),
www.businessinsider.com/san-francisco-system-to-track-homeless-persons.
156
See Unsheltered Homelessness: Trends, Causes, and Strategies to Address,
NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS, (July 26, 2017), https://endhomelessness.
org/resource/unsheltered-homelessness-trends-causes-strategies-address/.
For
a
useful broader discussion, though locally focused, see Christopher F. Rufo, Seattle
Under Siege, CITY J., (Autumn 2018), www.city-journal.org/seattle-homelessness.
157
See Unsheltered Homelessness: Trends, Causes, and Strategies to Address,
supra note 156.
158
Presumably, making shelter life more viable, if not also more attractive,
could result in overcrowding, or lack of space for some persons otherwise interested
in shelter access. These outcomes could, in turn, lead to increased pressure for nonshelter-based responses to low income housing concerns.
159
See, e.g., Carol Galante & Carolina Reid, Expanding Housing Supply in
California: A New Framework For State Land Use Regulation, TERNER CTR. FOR
HOUSING INNOVATION (last visited Aug. 5, 2019), at 5, http://ternercenter.berkeley.
edu/uploads/CCRE_Journal_-_Expanding_Housing_Supply_in_California_-_A_New_
Framework_for_State_Land_Use_Regulation.pdf (“[B]y the time these revisions
pass, they often lack teeth or have so many restrictions that they apply only to a
‘mythical’ project.”). More generally, consider the broad range of regulatory
pathologies identified in PETER H. SCHUCK, WHY GOVERNMENT FAILS SO OFTEN
AND HOW IT CAN DO BETTER (2014).
160
See supra Part I.
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an enforceable federal constitutional right to housing, in any
meaningful form, would, again, allow the courts, along with the
rest of us, to bypass the unresolvable basic issues of
homelessness offenses and criminal responsibility already
examined above.161
CONCLUSION: BYPASSING THE UNRESOLVABLE PROBLEMS OF
HOMELESSNESS-RELATED CRIMINALIZATION AND THE
INADEQUACY OF POLITICS AS USUAL ON THE WAY TO A
CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHT TO HOUSING
Any complete argument for a federal constitutional right to
some form of housing must first appeal to basic values, basic
interests, basic human capacities, and basic needs,162 however
unaccommodating American constitutional law has historically
been in this regard.163 There seems to be no reason why
arguments grounded in part on some combination of important
values, interests, and needs cannot ultimately be successful.
Of course, arguing for a constitutional right to some minimal
housing only at this most fundamental level can be a bit tricky.
It is, for example, tempting to think of some sort of housing right
as a matter of basic values such as genuine freedom,164 material
equality,165 or basic human flourishing.166 But many homeless

161

See supra Part I.
For a useful and concise summary of the international human rights law
bearing upon housing, see The Right to Adequate Housing, Fact Sheet No. 21/Rev. 1,
OFF. U.N. HIGH COMMISSIONER FOR HUMAN RTS., at 10–15, https://www.ohchr.org/
Documents/Publications/FS21_rev_1_Housing_en.pdf. See also Maria Foscarinas, et
al., The Human Right to Housing: Making the Case in U.S. Advocacy, 38
CLEARINGHOUSE REV. 97, 98–100 (2004); Katy Wells, The Right to Housing, 67(2)
POL. STUD. ASS’N 406, 409–10 (2019), https://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/
0032321718769009; Christopher Essert, Property and Homelessness, 44 PHIL. & PUB.
AFF. 266, 275 (2016).
163
See Lindsey v. Normet, 406 U.S. 56, 74 (1972); Lisa T. Alexander, Occupying
the Constitutional Right to Housing, 94 NEB. L. REV. 245, 248 (2015). For a broader
consideration, see R. George Wright, Homelessness and the Missing Constitutional
Dimension of Fraternity, 46 U. LOUISVILLE L. REV. 427, 437–38 (2008).
164
See Jeremy Waldron, Homelessness and the Issue of Freedom, 39 UCLA L.
REV. 295, 295–96 (1991).
165
See generally Akhil Reed Amar, Forty Acres and a Mule: A Republican
Theory of Minimal Entitlements, 13 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 37, 37, 40, 43 (1990)
(relying less on equality of distribution than on some less demanding standard of
baseline minimalism or sufficientariansim); see also generally HARRY FRANKFURT,
ON INEQUALITY (2015); GEORGE SHER, EQUALITY FOR INEGALITARIANS (2014).
166
For broad background, see Gregory S. Alexander, Ownership and
Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property, 1–3 (2013),
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persons most want not a classic free and open choice between
homelessness and nonhomelessness, but simply a viable home,
whether freely chosen or not.167 Freedom in the sense of choice
among viable options is really not crucial in this context. As well,
thinking of a constitutional right to some sort of housing instead
in terms of equality is certainly useful.
But any such
constitutional right would obviously be thought of in terms such
as minimal adequacy, decency, or sufficiency of the housing,
rather than in terms of the size or quality of any guaranteed
shelter being equal to that of some selected comparison group.168
Adequacy, decency, and sufficiency do not imply substantive
equality. There would be an equal right to some sort of housing,
but hardly a right that everyone’s housing be equal in quality to
everyone else’s. And while it is also certainly sensible to think of
a constitutional right to housing in terms of human flourishing,
important work would remain to be done in translating the
general idea of human flourishing into a more determinate
conception that would imply a federal constitutional right.169
These complications, however, hardly undermine the
possibility of a persuasive cumulative and converging multielement case, incorporating arguments at the most basic
normative level, for a federal constitutional right to housing.
Our focus herein has been on promoting the idea of a federal
constitutional right to minimal housing by triangulation, through
separate perspectives and motivations, exerting cumulating
pressure from different directions. Separate components of an
argument for a constitutional right to housing are, on this
approach, coordinated and brought to bear jointly.
This Article highlights that criminalizing homelessness and
homelessness-related statuses and conduct leads to unresolvable
problems at the level of basic criminal theory.170
These
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/facpub/653/; GREGORY S. ALEXANDER, PROPERTY
AND HUMAN FLOURISHING ch. 10 (2018).
167
See Wright, supra note 163, at 454. But cf. Waldron, supra note 164, at 303
(“The freedom that means most to a person who is cold and wet is the freedom that
consists in staying under whatever shelter he has found.”).
168
See sources cited supra note 165.
169
The idea of human flourishing, as classically elaborated by Aristotle and in
Professor Alexander’s general property theory, is more general than the concept of
community and community responsibility developed by Alexander. See Alexander,
Ownership and Obligations: The Human Flourishing Theory of Property, supra note
166; see also Wright, supra note 163, at 438–39 (discussing the relevant application
of the ideas of community, fraternity, and solidarity).
170
See supra Part I.
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unresolvable problems are of varying degrees of breadth and
context-specificity,171 and these problems are plainly sufficiently
important to impeach the logic and fairness of typical
criminalization of homelessness. A constitutional right to some
sort of housing effectively bypasses these evidently unsolvable
problems of personal criminal responsibility.
This Article then focused on the role of governments, at all
levels, in causally contributing to homelessness in general
through various consciously chosen government policies.172 For
the sake of simplicity, this Article focused on government policies
as among the important causes of homelessness in general, as
opposed to focusing on particular categories of homelessness.
But it should be clear that consciously adopted government
policies have affected, positively and negatively, the incidence of
homelessness among, say, deinstitutionalized but seriously
mentally ill persons,173 traumatized or otherwise vulnerable
discharged military veterans,174 and newly released ex-offenders
who are ill-prepared for transitioning to self-sufficient life in the
community.175
Thus, whatever the level of government, and however we
think of the problem of homelessness, it is clear that consciously
adopted government policies, of various sorts, have substantially
171

Some problems of voluntariness, freedom, and responsibility are thus specific
to homelessness, while others are of much broader scope and applicability.
172
See supra Part I.
173
See, e.g., H.R. Lamb, Deinstitutionalization and the Homeless Mentally Ill,
35 HOSP. & CMTY. PSYCHIATRY 899, 899 (1984), www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/
pubmed/6479924; Daniel Yohanna, Deinstitutionalization of People with Mental
Illness: Causes and Consequences, 15 AM. MED. ASSOC. J. ETHICS 886, 886
(October 2013), https://ournalofethics.ama-assn.org/article/deinstitutionalizationpeople-mental-illness.
174
For background, see generally Veteran Homelessness, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO
END HOMELESSNESS (Apr. 22, 2015), https://endhomelessness.org/resource/veteranhomelessness/; Background & Statistics, NAT’L COALITION FOR HOMELESS
VETERANS (last visited Aug. 7, 2019), http://nchv.org/index.php/news/media/
background_and_statistics/. Specific categories of homelessness may co-present, and
interact, in the cases of individual homeless persons. For context, see § 5 of The 2017
Annual Homeless Assessment Report to Congress, U.S. DEP’T HOUSING & URB.
DEV. (Dec. 2017), https://files.hudexchange.info/resources/documents/2017-AHARPart-2.pdf.
175
For relevant data, see Claire W. Herbert et al., Homelessness and Housing
Insecurity Among Former Prisoners, 1 RUSSELL SAGE FOUND. J. SOC. SCI. 44 (2016),
www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC4762459; Mindy Mitchell, Homelessness and
Incarceration Are Intimately Linked, NAT’L ALLIANCE TO END HOMELESSNESS
(Mar. 29, 2018), https://endhomelessness.org/homelessness-incarceration-intimatelylinked-new-federal-funding-available-reduce-harm/ (“Almost 50,000 people a year
enter homeless shelters immediately after exiting incarceration.”).
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contributed, directly or indirectly, to homelessness of all sorts.176
These crucial government-policy contributions to the underlying
pathologies exert a further intellectual and moral pressure on
government to rectify the lamentable phenomena of
homelessness to which it has substantially contributed.
Governments in general are thus clearly implicated, causally and
morally, in what is normally recognized as among the most
serious and fundamental sorts of deprivations.
At this point, it is no longer plausible or morally satisfactory
for governments to adopt only modest programs, or merely to
spend incrementally more, on homelessness-related programs.
Typical programs, at whatever level of government, have plainly
had only modest positive effects, and often amount merely to
attempts to counteract with one set of policies the homelessness
often predictably generated by other sets of government
policies.177
Consider, by way of analogy, how one would respond to a
government that recognized a constitutional right to legal
counsel in criminal cases,178 but that was content with only
partial compliance with that constitutional right, with the level
of actual compliance varying more or less randomly, and with the
government taking credit for years of slightly greater compliance,
and promising to try to do better after the years of slightly lower
compliance. Or consider, also outside the homelessness context,
the federal constitutional right to not be subjected to cruel and
unusual punishment.179 What would the proper public response
be to a government that in fact tended to causally contribute to

176

See generally supra Part II.
Consider, for example, local homeless service programs that only partially
offset the homelessness causing effects of a range of other governmental polices. In
general, modest increases in funding, against a continuing background of
government policy causal contributions to homelessness, is unlikely to be effective.
See David S. Lucas, The Impact of Federal Homelessness Funding on Homelessness,
84 S. ECON. J. 548, 548–49 (2017).
178
See, e.g., Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 344 (1963). This constitutional
right to counsel as explicitly wealth redistributive and publicly costly, would also
count as a “positive” constitutional right. But see Robert C. Ellickson, The Untenable
Case for an Unconditional Right to Shelter, 15 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 17, 17 (1992)
(foregrounding negative constitutional rights).
179
See U.S. CONST. amend. VIII; Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100–01 (1958)
(discussing the “evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing
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inhumane prison conditions, but that was content with both
modest reform efforts, and correspondingly limited success, in
reducing the number of such constitutional violations?
Importantly, a federal constitutional right to minimal
housing need not involve any level of government as a typical
provider of housing as a matter of first resort.180 The crucial first
step would instead involve imposing a heavier burden of
constitutional justification on all government policies, at
whatever level, that have the effect, separately or jointly, of
significantly contributing over time to homelessness.181 And we
should not expect a constitutional right to housing to be, in its
contours, any more textually precise than, say, the scope in
actual practice of the Commerce Clause.182 The scope of any right
to housing should, however, reflect substantive interests,
including the need to maintain reasonable incentives for socially
productive behavior.183
Finally, the logic of a distinctly federal-level constitutional
right to housing is in part a matter of recognizing that the basic
indignities of homelessness, and the basic moral and
constitutional values at stake,184 do not substantially vary in
their nature across state lines.185
As well, the federal
government controls far greater resources than do individual
states in meaningfully addressing homelessness and has
important advantages of scale in affirmatively responding to
homelessness. And while local knowledge will certainly be
180
For a discussion of implementation issues, see, for example, Shelby D. Green,
Imagining a Right to Housing: Lying in the Interstices, 19 GEO. J. POVERTY L. &
Pol’y 392, 442 (2012) (discussing, among other considerations, imposing a heavier
burden of legal justification on all policy measures that operate, even inadvertently,
to exacerbate homelessness).
181
See id. As with any other constitutional right, whether negative or positive,
issues of eligibility and of line drawing would of course require determination and
revision. See id.
182
See id.; see also McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 407 (1819)
(“[W]e must never forget that it is a [broadly phrased] constitution we are
expounding.”) (emphasis in the original). Historically, the Court seemed concerned
about problems of line drawing in Lindsey v. Normet, 406 U.S. 56 (1972). Line
drawing problems are probably more severe, however, in equal protection,
substantive due process, free speech, and religion cases.
183
See Ellickson, supra note 178, at 17. Professor Ellickson appears to focus on a
constitutional right to housing only in conjunction with a number of other costly
positive constitutional rights. See id.
184
See supra notes 163–169 and accompanying text.
185
The constitutionally appropriate responses to homelessness may well,
however, reflect local living cost differences, once the legal and politically imposed
causes of homelessness have been negated or removed.
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valuable in responding in qualitatively different ways to
homelessness,186 federal authority would likely be necessary to
overcome any local inclination to shift problems of homelessness
onto neighboring jurisdictions, rather than to more meaningfully
address the pathologies of homelessness.187 These considerations,
taken collectively, thus triangulate upon a federal constitutional
right to housing, and tend jointly to apply more rational and
moral pressure, from various directions, toward the recognition
of such a right.

186

Investigation of the impact on homelessness of various local policies should
presumably begin at the local level. As well, the motivating sentiments of
community, solidarity, and fraternity in particular may, in many cases, be stronger
at local levels. For background, see Wright, supra note 163.
187
For a sense of the common local impulse to strategically, if also selfishly,
“free ride” on the presumed efforts of other, perhaps similarly motivated,
neighboring jurisdictions, see Wright, supra note 163, at 468–70.

